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By combining the one-way coupled chaotic map lattice system with a bit-reverse operation, we
construct a new cryptosystem which is extremely sensitive to the system parameters even for low-
dimensional systems. The security of this new algorithm is investigated and mechanism of the
sensitivity is analyzed. We further apply this cryptosystem to the public channel cryptography,
based on ”Merkle’s puzzles”, by employing it both as pseudo-random-number (PN) generators and
symmetric encryptor. With the properties of spatiotemporal chaos, the new scheme is rich with new
features and shows some advantages in comparison with the conventional ones.
PACS numbers: 05.45.Vx
One serious problem in chaos synchronization
based encryptions is that parameters close to the
secret key can still synchronize systems to a cer-
tain extent, and usually appears a regular struc-
ture in the key space under the known-plaintext
attack. In other words, there is always a key basin
of finite width around the secret key. The keys
in this basin are highly correlated, and the sys-
tem security is broken once the location of the
key basin is located and explored. Although in
some methods, like those exploiting spatiotempo-
ral chaos or the modulo operation, can complicate
the cryptanalysis, system security is still vulner-
able because the basin width increases monotoni-
cally with the amount of known plaintext. In this
paper, we incorporate a conventional bit opera-
tion, the bit-reverse operation, into spatiotempo-
ral chaos, and find that the basin width shrinks
to zero in terms of the computational precision.
This approach not only extends the definition of
the secret key to the real domain and enlarges
the capacity of the key space accordingly, but
also overcomes the problem of correlations in key
basin entirely. Using the proposed cryptosystem
both as a set of pseudo-random-number (PN)
generators and a symmetric encryptor, we fur-
ther investigate the feasibility of public channel
cryptography based on chaos, and propose a pro-
totype for application. In comparison with the
conventional methods, the new model is superior
in many aspects: flexibility, manageability, and
simplicity. These new features, together with the
experimental progress in chaos-based communi-
cation, make this scheme a good candidate for
public channel cryptography both in software and
hardware.
I. INTRODUCTION
As an important application of chaos, chaos-based se-
cure communication and cryptography attracted contin-
uous interest over the last decade [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9, 10, 11, 12]. For convenience and flexibility, most of
the proposed schemes are based on the phenomenon of
chaos synchronization, where two chaotic systems can be
synchronized through driving or coupling [1, 13]. While
synchronization brings certain advantages for practical
applications, it also presents some drawbacks on the sys-
tem security [14, 15, 16]. Later it is found that even
for high dimensional chaotic systems, which usually pos-
sess higher complexity and multiple positive Lyapunov
exponents, the system security is still vulnerable under
some sophisticated attacks [11]. Besides the problem of
security, in comparison to those conventional schemes
used widely in engineering, the performance of chaos en-
cryptions are also disappointing in other aspects such
as having low encryption speed and high bit error rate,
etc [17, 18, 19]. How to design a secure while efficient
cryptosystem has always been a challenge for the chaos
cryptographer.
More recently, the study of applying one-way coupled
map lattices (OCML) for encryption sheds some new
light on this research [8]. One significant point of this
scheme is that two classical numerical operations, namely
integration and modulation, are incorporated into the
chaotic dynamics. With these operations, system se-
curity, as well as other performance indicators, can be
greatly improved to a comparable level with those of the
conventional ones, such as DES and AES [9]. In a most
recent study [10], system security is further improved by
adding a S-box, another technique typically used in con-
ventional encryptions, to the coupled lattices. As a result
the capacity of the key space is further enlarged and the
system becomes even more sensitive on the parameters.
However, these schemes still suffer from the problem of
the ”continuity” of chaotic dynamics, i.e., correlations
still exist between the keys [11].
In conventional cryptography, encryption schemes are
2divided into symmetric and asymmetric methods [20]. In
contrast to the symmetric methods, the keys in the asym-
metric methods are generated in pairs, a public key and
a private key, and it is computationally not feasible to
deduce the private key from the public key. Anyone with
the public key can encrypt a message but not decrypt
it. Only the person with the private key can decrypt
the message. Mathematically, the process is based on
the trap-door one-way functions, and encryption is the
easy direction and decryption is the difficult direction.
Communication strategies that use asymmetric methods
for encryption have much greater inherent security than
symmetric methods, since they eliminate the problem of
key distribution, which itself can pose the most serious
security risk. However, most of the proposed chaos-based
encryption schemes are within the branch of symmetric
methods, and little attention has been paid to asymmet-
ric encryptions, or public-key cryptography (PKC) [21].
Whereas all known PKC algorithms are based on some
hard problems in number theory (factoriation, knapsack,
discrete logarithms, etc.), it is of great interest and chal-
lenge to construct PKC algorithms based on dynamics.
In the present work, we propose a new scheme of chaos-
based symmetric encryption and, using the proposed
cryptosystem both as symmetric encryptor and pseudo-
random-number (PN) generators, design a prototype for
public channel cryptography. In the new cryptosystem,
the outputs are extremely sensitive to the secret key. Any
detectable mismatch of the secret key, of the order of the
computer precision, will induces a totally different set of
outputs. Hence this scheme not only overcomes the ba-
sic problem of ”continuity” met in chaos-based encryp-
tions, but also extends the definition of the secret key to
all real values in the key space. Borrowing the concept
of ”Merkle’s Puzzles” [22], we further construct a new
model for public channel cryptography where all blocks
are endowed with spatiotemporal chaos. In comparison
with conventional methods, the new model is found to
be more efficient and flexible in some aspects.
This paper is arranged as follows. In Section II we
describe our new method for constructing chaos-based
cryptosystems and, in Section III, we give a detailed dis-
cussion of its sensitivity and security. The prototype for
PKC is presented in Section IV, and the system security
is analyzed in Section V. We highlight the new features
and advantages of the PKC in Section VI.
II. CONSTRUCTING CRYPTOSYSTEM OF
HIGH SECURITY
As cryptosystems based on low dimensional chaos have
been shown [14] to be vulnerable, there have been several
efforts to improve the security by employing spatiotem-
poral chaos [7]. Although these cryptosystems perform
well against some conventional attacks (like the differen-
tial and linear attacks), and can even resist some clas-
sical chaos-based attacks (like the return map and re-
construction attacks [14]), they still suffer some inherent
drawbacks from chaos dynamics [11, 17]. For example,
when chaos synchronization is used for encryption, the
keys close to the secret key can still synchronize the re-
ceiver system to a certain extent, thus forming a key
basin around the secret key. (For more details about the
definition of key basin, please refer Ref. [8, 11].) Since
the system security is directly connected with the struc-
ture of this basin, it be broken down once the location of
this basin is explored. Based on this, an effective known-
plaintext attack [20], the error function attack (EFA),
has been proposed specifically for cracking chaos syn-
chronization based cryptosystems [11]. It is found that,
under EFA, most of the proposed cryptosystems are vul-
nerable or not secure at all, and for some situations the
higher dimensionality does not help to improve system
security.
The underlying reason for this ”continuity” is that the
Lyapunov exponent (LE) in conventional chaotic systems
is not large enough to quickly diffuse the nearby states
in phase space. It is thus natural to look to the explo-
ration and construction of chaotic systems with large LE
for chaos cryptography, at least as far as EFA attack is
concerned. Along this direction, two methods have been
proposed [9]: (1) using several of the last significant dig-
its as the output signals and, (2) coupling lattices with a
weak signal. Through these methods, system sensitivity
can be significantly improved, and the width of the key
basin shrinks accordingly. However, as pointed out in
Ref. [10], there still exists a scaling between the amount
of known plaintext and the width of the key basin: the
more plaintext is known, the wider the key basin will
be. In this respect, the problem of the key basin remains
fundamentally unsolved.
We extend the study in Ref. [10] and aim to design
cryptosystems that are ”truly”’ secure. By this we mean
cryptosystems with the property that the sizes of the
key basins are of the order of the computational preci-
sion (or the measure precision in practice), and which
remain unchanged with the amount of plaintext known
to the attacker. Instead of the S-box, we construct the
transmitter by incorporating a bit-reverse operation, F ,
into the one-way lattice ring of N coupled logistic maps,
and the dynamics of the transmitter can be formulated
as
x0(n) = SN (n)/2
υ,
x1(n+ 1) = (1 − ε1)f [x1(n)] + ε1f [x0(n)],
x2(n+ 1) = (1 − ε2)f [x2(n)] + ε2f{F [x1(n)]/2
υ},(1)
xi(n+ 1) = (1 − εi)f [xi(n)] + εif [xi−1(n)],
f = 4x(1 − x), i = 3, 4, ..., N,
with
SN (n) = {int[xN (n)× 10
h]} mod 2υ,
F (x) = Reverse{int[x× 10h] mod 2υ}. (2)
3Reverse{ } represents a bit-reverse operation which re-
verses the bit string of an integer and generate another
integer as the output. 2υ is a large integer and 10−h is
the computer precision.
The dynamics of the receiver (denoted by variables
yi(n), i = 1, 2, ..., N) is identical to that of the trans-
mitter except that the first lattice, y1(n), is driven by
x0(n). It can be proved that the two systems can be
synchronized under the same driver signal, x0(n), given
εi > 0.75, i = 1, 2, ..., N . In our model, we fix εi = 0.95,
i = 2, ..., N , and adopt ε1 as the secret key and define
the key space as ε1 ∈ [0.95, 1).
For encryption, at the transmitter side, each lattice ex-
cept the first one can be regarded as an encryptor. To
encrypt a message Pi(n) in the ith channel, we simply
perform an XOR (exclusive OR) operation on this mes-
sage with the last significant υ bits of the information of
xi(n), and the output ciphertext reads
Ci(n) = XOR [Pi(n), Xi(n)],
Xi(n) = {int[xi(n)× 10
h]} mod 2υ, i = 2, ..., N (3)
The ciphertexts, Ci(n), and driver signal x0(n) are then
transmitted to the receiver. The receiver recovers the
transmitted message through the function
P ′i (n) = XOR [Ci(n), Yi(n)], i = 2, ..., N (4)
with Yi(n) having the same definition as Xi(n) but at
the receiver end. With the same secret key, ε1, the two
systems, x and y, can be completely synchronized, and
we finally have P ′i (n) = Pi(n).
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The key point of this cryptosystem is the bit-reverse
operation adopted in Eqs. 1. Since the only secret of
symmetric encryption is the key, the central task of such
a cryptosystem is to make the outputs, Xi, as sensitive to
the secret key as possible. In this scheme, any detectable
mismatch of ε1 (of the order of computer precision) will
affect at least the value of the last bit in X1. Due to
the bit-reverse function, this last significant bit becomes
the most significant one when coupled to x2, and thus
induces a large difference in X2 and other outputs as
well. This is further reflected in the behavior of the LE:
the bit-reverse operation is equal to increasing the largest
LE (LLE) with a value of about h ln 10. Thus, the LLE
in the newly constructed cryptosystem is estimated to be
λ′ ≈ λ+ h ln 10, (5)
with λ being the original LLE of OCML. For computa-
tions with double arithmetic precision, h = 16, and with
the last υ = 30 bits of information adopted as the out-
puts, the value of the LLE for N = 5 coupled lattices is
about λ′ ≈ 45, a value which can diffuse any detectable
mismatch of the secret key, ε1, to the order of its key
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FIG. 1: For OCMLs of size N = 5 and T = 2 × 106 known
plaintexts, the EFA results of the second channel for encryp-
tion schemes: (a) proposed in Ref. [8], and (b) proposed in
Section II. The width of the key basin in (b) is the same
as the computer precision, 10−16, and does not change as T
increases.
space within a few iterations, and thus totally confuses
the ”continuity” property in chaos dynamics.
For an eavesdropper, it is easier to attack the 2nd chan-
nel than the others (studies show that the security of
the encryption channel increases exponentially with the
size of the OCML [9]). We will thus focus on evaluating
the security of this channel in the following. Assuming
that the eavesdropper knows the whole dynamics of Eqs.
1 and can find an large amount of plaintext-ciphertext
pairs, all he/she needs is to explore the secret key, ε1, or
the key basin where it is located (we consider here the
most common attack used in cryptanalysis: the known-
plaintext attack). By trying some test keys, ε′
1
, the eaves-
dropper can study the structure of the key basin by the
EFA function [11],
e2(ε
′
1
) =
1
T
T∑
n=1
∣∣∣P ′2,ε′
1
(n)− P2,ε1(n)
∣∣∣ , (6)
with T the amount of known plaintext and P ′
2,ε′
1
is the
test plaintext generated under the test key ε′1. Usually
there will exist a key basin of a certain width around the
secret key, and the system security will be compromised
once this basin is explored.
In Fig. 1(a), we plot the EFA result of the model used
in Ref. [8] with respect to the mismatch between the test
key and the secret key, ∆ε = ε′
1
− ε1. It can be found,
around the secret key, that there exists a smooth basin
at least with a width of 10−7. With this basin structure,
once the location of the key basin be explored, one can
easily get close to the secret key, which is located at the
bottom of the key basin, using only several test keys by
some optimized searching methods. As a comparison, we
also plot in Fig. 1(b) the EFA result of Eqs. 1. It is
found that the width of the key basin is just the same
as the computer precision 10−16. The interesting feature
is that, in Fig. 1(b), the width of the key basin does
not increase with T . We plot Figs. 1(a) and (b) using
T = 2 × 106 known plaintexts, and had also tested dif-
ferent values of T up to 109. The results confirmed that
there is no change for these structures, and that the basin
in Fig. 1(b) still has the width of the order of the com-
puter precision. This property can be immensely useful
4in preventing attempts to undermine the system security
by studying the key basin structure (according to the
study of Ref. [10], even in systems where the modulo
operation is adopted, the relation between the key basin
width,W , and the amount of known plaintext, T , follows
the scaling W ∝ T 0.3).
Two points make this new cryptosystem distinctive
and advantage to other schemes. Firstly, the capacity of
the key space can be further extended. Every real value
in the key space can be regarded as an independent secret
key, and the number of independent keys in the key space
is limited only by the computer precision. Secondly, the
inherent property of ”continuity” in chaotic systems is
now avoided entirely at the level of computational preci-
sion. This renders it hopeless for those attacks based on
analyzing the structure of the key basin. For other en-
cryption performance indicators (such as the properties
of diffusion and confusion, correlations, robustness, etc.),
our numerical simulations [23] confirmed that there is no
difference between this new cryptosystem and the former
schemes (Ref. [8, 9]).
IV. APPLYING CHAOS-BASED
CRYPTOSYSTEM FOR PUBLIC CHANNEL
CRYPTOGRAPHY
Besides encryption, due to its excellence performance
on statistical properties, the proposed cryptosystem also
can be used as a set of pseudo-random-number (PN) gen-
erators. For this purpose, each lattice can be regarded as
an independent PN generator, and all these generators
produce PN sequences simultaneously. We have checked
the random properties of these sequences with different
types of evaluations (such as the run distribution, bal-
ance, power spectrum density, etc.) for arbitrary plain-
texts, and they passed all these checkings satisfactorily
[23]. In addition, in comparison with the conventional
PN sequences, these new sequences possess extremely
long periods which increase exponentially both with the
system size and the computer precision. Another inter-
esting observation is that although there is no statistical
correlation between these sequences, teh lattices are still
under the dynamical relation of generalized synchroniza-
tion (GS) [24]. This special property can be of great use
in certain situations where a large number of indepen-
dent PN generators are required to operate simultane-
ously, and yet are to be kept in step in some sense. The
GS relation between lattices also makes it possible to ma-
nipulate all these generators with only a few controllers.
Rather than adjusting all parameters in the generators,
now we are able to generate a totally different set of PN
sequences through resetting only one or a few parame-
ters.
In the field of conventional cryptography, there is one
type of PKC, namely the ”Merkle’s Puzzles”, whose secu-
rity depends on the protocol rather than number theory.
Different to the other PKC schemes, where both the pub-
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FIG. 2: Prototype for public channel cryptography con-
structed by three OCMLs. The dash lines represent feedback
or driving signals, shadowed numbers represent the identify-
ing codes, and ”//” means OCML ”K” is triggered each time
T
′.
lic key and private key are predefined, in ”Merkle’s Puz-
zles”, both keys are decided by the receiver at random,
and the keys will be destroyed after each transmission. A
set of independent PN generators and one efficient sym-
metric encryptor are the basic blocks for this PKC. In
conventional methods, usually it is difficult to manage
(mainly store and compare) such a large number of PNs;
it is also not easy to find a symmetric encryptor whose se-
curity can be adjusted flexibly so as to keep pace with the
improving computer speed. In this section, we will apply
the above proposed cryptosystem on ”Merkle’s Puzzles”.
The prototype of the PKC is plotted in Fig. 2. The
transmitter is composed of two OCMLs, OCML ”K”
(”K”) used as PN generators and OCML ”A” (”A”) used
as symmetric encryptor. The receiver comprises the de-
cryptor OCML ”B” (”B”). All OCMLs follow Eqs. 1.
Without ”K”, the dynamics of the transmitter is identi-
cal to that of the receiver, and it is just the cryptosys-
tem for symmetric encryption proposed in Section II.
”S” represents the bit-reverse operation in Eqs. 2. ”K”
has two functions: (1) generating plaintext for ”A” and,
(2) modulating the coupling strength of the first lattice
(which is used as the session key for the symmetric en-
cryptions between ”A” and ”B”), ε1,A, in ”A”. ”K” is
triggered for each time interval T ′, a session during which
both the plaintext and ε1,A remain constant. Following
that, in the next T ′ iterations, ”A” encrypts the plain-
text outputted from ”K” repeatedly under the session
key ε1,A(j), with j the iteration time of ”K”.
For the transmitter, the only secret is the parameter
ε1,K . Both the dynamics, ”K” and ”A”, and the initial
conditions of ”K” are public. The transmitter has two
missions: producing a large number of encryption ses-
sions and deducing the private key chosen by the receiver.
For the receiver, the dynamics is public and, before de-
ciding on the public keys, the authorized receiver has no
privilege over the eavesdropper. The task of the receiver
is to decrypt one of the transmitted sessions at random,
5and returns the decrypted plaintexts - the public keys -
to the transmitter through the public channel.
The details about how to transmit a private key
through the public channel can be described as follows
(for OCMLs of size N = 5):
1. ”K” generates 5 integers, Xi,K(j), i = 1, ..., 5, by
Eqs. 3, and marks each of the later four integers
with an identification code Ii,K . For instance, in
Fig. 2, let us assume the binary format of the gen-
erated integer by x2,K is X2,K(j) =‘001’, and mark
it with an identification code I2,K =‘000000’. (For
simplicity, the word lengths of the integer and the
identification code here are just used to illustrate
the operations, and in actual simulations both are
with the word length of υ = 30.) The identifi-
cation code is only used for marking the channels
and is also public. There is no identification code
for X1,K(j), which will be used to modulate the
parameter ε1,A in ”A”. After this, ”K” will be dor-
mant until triggered again for the next session after
time T ′.
2. Treating all the marked integers as plaintext, each
channel of ”A”, according to Eqs. 3, encrypts the
same plaintext repeatedly for T ′ times under the
same session key, ε1,A(j), which is modulated by
the integer X1,K(j) through function
ε1,A(j) = 0.95 +
1
20
X1,K(j)/2
υ. (7)
3. The transmitter repeats steps (1) and (2) until
a large number, L, of sessions are generated and
transmitted to the receiver.
4. ”B” chooses one session at random and performs a
brute-force attack to recover the session key ε1,A(j)
by checking the decrypted channel identification
codes (which are predefined and public) through
synchronization. (T ′ is set so as to ensure that
”A” and ”B” can be synchronized for any random
initial conditions. In this prototype, T ′ = 100 is
large enough for this purpose.) This is a large, but
still manageable, amount of work.
5. After being able to crack one of the sessions suc-
cessfully, ”B” keeps the last recovered plaintext
X5,K(j) as the private key and returns all other
recovered plaintexts, Xi,K(j), i = 2, 3, 4, to the
transmitter together with their identification codes.
The return messages are transferred to ”K” in the
form of plaintext and are public to everyone. These
plaintexts make up the set of public keys.
6. After receiving the public keys, the transmitter
runs ”K” with the predefined initial conditions
(which is also public) and his secret key ε1,K
(known only to the transmitter). Once the outputs
of the lattices match up the returned public keys
in each corresponding channel simultaneously, the
transmitter will know that the output of the last
lattice, X5,K(j), is the private key which the re-
ceiver had chosen, and which will be used for later
communications.
V. SECURITY OF PUBLIC CHANNEL
CRYPTOGRAPHY
The security of this PKC depends on the number of
sessions transmitted. The eavesdropper can break this
system, but he has to do far more work than either the
transmitter or the receiver. To recover the private key
X5,K(j) in steps (4) and (5), on average, he has to per-
form a brute-force attack against about half of the trans-
mitted sessions generated in step (3). Assuming that in
total there are L sessions transmitted in the public chan-
nel, the attack of the eavesdropper has a complexity of
L/2 times that of the receiver. The public keys, Xi,K(j),
i = 2, 3, 4, will not help the eavesdropper either; they
are independent PNs generated by the cryptosystem Eqs.
1. In general, the eavesdropper has to expend approxi-
mately the square of the effort that the receiver expends.
This advantage is small by cryptographic standards, but
in some circumstances it may be enough. For instance, in
simulations (on a Pentium computer of 2GHZ CPU and
521M RAM, Fortran90 compiler), we set the duration for
each session as T ′ = 100 and the key space of the range
ε1,A ∈ [0.95, 0.95+ 1× 10
−8], the transmitter can gener-
ate about L ≈ 1 × 108 sessions in one minute, and the
receiver needs another minute to explore one session key
ε1,A(j). However, with the same computing facilities, it
will take the eavesdropper about two years to break the
system, a time that is likely to be longer than the useful
lifetime of the secret message.
The eavesdropper can of course attack only the pri-
vate key X5,K used in the later communications, with-
out considering the problem of PKC. But with the sys-
tem under consideration, the private key can be com-
bined randomly and adjusted freely both in length and
position. While this add no additional cost to PKC, it
will be a disaster for an eavesdropper and he/she finally
has to fall back on attacking the sessions. Meanwhile,
the excellent performance on correlations of the system
prevents any attempt to deduce the private key X5,K(j)
from the public keys Xi,K(j), i = 2, 3, 4. The knowl-
edge of the initial conditions cannot help with predicting
ε1,K(j) or X5,K(j) either. With the bit-reverse opera-
tion, the difference between two corresponding outputs,
∆Xi,K(j) = |Xi,K(j)−Xi,K′(j)|, increases to the order
of attractor size within a few iterations, and after that
the behavior of the two systems are totally different. (For
example, with N = 5 and ∆ε = ε1,K − ε1,K′ = 10
−16, it
needs only about 5 iterations on average for ∆X > 1/3,
a smiple criterion in testing randomness [8].) So the only
thing the eavesdropper can do is to find out the secret
key ε1,K . The problem of security returns to that of the
6symmetric cryptography and, according to our security
analysis in Section III, there is no shortcut but to try all
the possible values of ε1,K in [0.95, 1) or an even larger
range.
In summary, the practical security of PKC only relies
on that of the symmetric encryption, both for the PN
generators, ”K”, and the encryptor, ”A”. Given that
there is no systematic cryptanalysis developed for the
new cryptosystem, the proposed PKC will be secure.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
While the incorporated bit-reverse operation improves
the security of the chaos-based cryptosystem to a new
level, the adaptation of this cryptosystem for PKC brings
new features and advantages for other real applications
as well.
• Unlike conventional approaches, the same cryp-
tosystem, Eqs. 1, can be used both as encryptor
and PN generators. This feature can bring certain
convenience both for security analysis and model
design.
• In conventional methods, the transmitter has to
store all the PNs in a group and find the private
key which matches up the returned public keys by a
brute-force comparison, which usually involve large
amounts of memory space and computer resource.
By adopting ”K” as the PN generators, all these
keys can be automatically regenerated through the
dynamics of OCML. Since the security of PKC re-
lies on the number of sessions transmitted, this
property also makes it possible to implement PKC
in situations where memory space is scarce and
computer speed is limited.
• Although one could replace each lattice in ”K” with
a separate conventional PN generator, in real appli-
cations it is usually hard to keep them working in
step. But this problem does not appear for OCML,
where all sequences are outputted simultaneously
under the relation of GS.
• The process of recovering the private key X5,K(j)
from the public keysXi,K(j), i = 2, 3, 4, is achieved
by the trap-door ε1,K , the only secret of the trans-
mitter. With the trap-door, it is easy to recover
all keys of the chosen session, but this fails for any
detectable mismatch. In this regard, the proposed
OCML actually can be used as a one-way function
with the trap-door ε1,K .
The proposed PKC also enjoys all advantages of tra-
ditional chaotic systems. The security of encryptor ”A”
can be updated easily either by enlarging its key space or
combining more couplings as the session key, which make
this scheme easily adjustable to different security require-
ments. In addition to the implementations on software,
the proposed scheme is expected to be efficient on hard-
ware as well, judging from the progress in chaos experi-
ments [25]. The dynamics based cryptography makes it
not only easy to formulate and analyze system security
in theory, but also simple to design and operate the con-
structed cryptosystems in applications. Meanwhile, the
performance of PKC can be further enhanced by chaos-
based spread-spectrum communications [23]. Whereas
the security of PKC relies on the number of transmitted
sessions, it is highly recommended to transmit these data
through a wide-band channel so as to achieve a fast speed,
and chaotic signals, with their excellent performance on
correlations, can be used for this purpose directly.
In conclusion, we have proposed in this paper a way
of improving the security of chaos-based cryptosystem to
the order of measure precision, and applied it to PKC
by using the system both as PN generators and symmet-
ric encryptor. Incorporating the conventional bit-reverse
operation, we successfully overcome the problem of ”con-
tinuity” in chaotic systems, and equip the conventional
scheme of PKC with new characteristics of spatiotempo-
ral chaos.
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